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Resumo
O objetivo deste trabalho é testar a existência do trade-oﬀ entre super-
visão e salários em uma empresa do ramometal mecânico no sul do Brasil.
A metodologia utilizada para avaliar os efeitos sobre a produtividade e a
eficiência dos trabalhadores foi o estimador de diferenças em diferenças.
Avaliando os resultados, constatou-se que o aumento de supervisão gerou
um aumento na produtividade entre 13,5% a 26,8%. Assim, com o au-
mento da produtividade, cabe à firma escolher entre aumentar o nível de
supervisão ao custo de US$ 624,98 ou praticar salários eficiência ao custo
de US$ 2.907,72.
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Abstract
The objective of this work was to test the existence of a trade-oﬀ be-
tween supervision and wages in a metal mechanical firm in Southern
Brazil. The methodology used to assess the eﬀects on productivity and
the worker eﬃciency was the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimator. Evalu-
ating the results, it was found that with increased supervision, there was
an increase in productivity ranging between 13.5% and 26.8%. Therefore,
with increased productivity, the company has to choose between increas-
ing the level of supervision, at a cost of US$ 624.98 or practicing eﬃciency
wages at a cost of US$ 2,907.72.
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1 Introduction1
The goal of this paper was to test the existence of a trade-oﬀ between supervi-
sion and wages using the eﬃciency wages model (Shapiro & Stiglitz 1984) in a
private firm in the metal mechanics field. The basic question to be addressed
is what the eﬀects and implications of the diﬀerent levels of supervision are
on the workers performance in a context of asymmetric information. The ef-
ficiency wages theory (shirking model) suggests there is a trade-oﬀ between
supervision and wages. If there is such trade-oﬀ, companies would have to
choose between two human resource practices: adoption of wages higher than
the labor market wage average (eﬃciency wages), or the increase of supervi-
sion to improve the possibility of detecting worker shirking behavior. Since
this paper uses data from within a private firm, it also aims to contribute to
the modern literature on Personnel Economics which according to Lazear &
Shaw (2007) “(...) drills deeply into the company to study human resource
management practices”.
The case and empirical analyses are based on data from Bruning, a metal
mechanic firm, located in the municipality of Panambi (Rio Grande do Sul –
Brazil). Bruning has two groups of workers in an assembly line of aluminum
fuel tanks for trucks. One group works at daytime shift (group 1) and the
other at night shift (group 2). For group 2 there was an increase in the degree
of supervision in the assembly line at a given time. The paper considers two
hypotheses. First, before the change in supervision for group 2, productivity
should be higher in Group 1 than in Group 2 (with diﬀerent supervision lev-
els and without wage diﬀerences). Second, after the change in supervision
for group 2, the productivity of Group 2 should be near or similar to that of
Group 1 (with the same supervision level). In other words, the goal here is to
verify whether the increase in the degree of supervision in the second group
had any positive impact on its labor productivity and labor eﬃciency. To ac-
complish the task, the empirical strategy relies on diﬀerences-in-diﬀerence
estimation, since data of two diﬀerent groups in relation to the supervision in
two diﬀerent moments are available: before and after the supervision shock.
The paper investigates the supervision shock on both the productivity and
eﬃciency of workers.
This paper follows the approach of Shaw (2009), entitled Insider Econo-
metrics, that seeks to test the impact of human resources policies and other
management practices on employee productivity (Personnel Economics). In
this paper, are two of the main characteristics of an Insider Econometrics
study pointed out by Ichniowski & Shaw (2013) are present: data from within
the firm and an econometric tool to measure the eﬀect of a change in the ad-
ministrative/managerial practices.
Similar to a large number of Personnel Economics articles, this paper uses
personnel data from a single firm. It is possible to organize these kind of
Personnel Economics papers into two groups. The first group studies the role
of incentives and payment schemes on employee productivity (Lazear 2000,
Bandiera et al. 2005, 2007, 2009, Franceschelli et al. 2010), while the second
group evaluates the eﬀects of diﬀerent teamwork arrangements on employee
productivity (Bandiera et al. 2009, Jones et al. 2010, Frick et al. 2013). No
1We would like to thank the Edward Lazear, Helio Zylberstajn, Luiz Alberto Esteves and
Daniel Uhr for their comments, as well as the participants of the PPGE/UFRGS seminar and
financial support under the CAPES Pró-Integração Project (Announcement 55/2013).
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papers were found in Personnel Economics with Insider Econometrics that
investigated the role of supervision on productivity. In addition, no papers
of Personnel Economics with Insider Econometrics involving Brazilian firms
were found. The authors believe that the present study contributes to filling
these gaps.
With respect to the use of case studies in Personnel Economics, Jones et al.
(2008) argue that econometric case studies (whose definition is similar to In-
sider Econometrics) may provide better internal validity than studies based
on surveys of cross-company, cross-industry, etc. According to those authors,
this happens because in case studies it is possible to get better measurements
of both dependent variables (producitivity, eﬃciency, etc) and Human Re-
sources Management (HRM) than in general surveys. Secondly, a case study
allows for a personal interaction between researchers and the managers of a
firm. Such interaction may result in a better understanding and identification
of important mechanisms and channels that link HRM and labor productiv-
ity. With regard to the external validity of case studies, Jones et al. (2008)
have argued that the criticism that involves them is overstated. These authors
claim that statistical generalization is indeed not appropriate when a research
relies on case study because probably one single firm does not represent a
population of firms. However, analytical generalization, which involves test-
ing hypothesis obtained from theory, may be strengthened due both to the
high internal validity of such studies and the adequate use of theory for the
specific context which is usually very detailed in case studies. According to
Ichniowski & Shaw (2013), the rich micro-level data on workers, products,
management practices, production process, and other firm characteristics al-
lows the test of theories on the determinants of the worker and firm produc-
tivity. These last points reinforce the contributions of this paper as it tests
theoretical hypothesis in an “experiment” with high internal validity.
On themain findings of this paper, the results obtained from the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence estimator suggest an increase in average daily productivity of the
workers who belong to Group 2 after the supervision increase. The estimated
eﬀect is between 13.5% and 26.8%, depending on the sample. The results
are robust to diﬀerent strategies of falsification. Regarding eﬃciency, the esti-
mated results are significant in only one of the samples used, which does not
allow us to perform a precise analysis of the eﬀect of supervision increase on
this variable.
In addition to this introduction, the paper has four more sections. In 2, the
shirking model is developed and discussed, with its theoretical implications
for the analyzed case. The third section provides a description of the Bruning
Industry, and detailing of the case. The fourth section presents the empirical
strategy and the analysis of the results. Finally, the fifth section contains the
conclusion with the main results of the case study, based upon what is seen in
the preceding sections.
2 Shirking model and supervision level
In the shirking model, Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984), the utility function (U ) for
the worker presents a relationship between wage (w) and eﬀort (e) and seeking
to maximize this function, it is assumed that:
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< 0 (1)
The higher the worker’s eﬀort (e), the smaller the utility (U ) of the wage
(w). In case the worker is unemployed, he will receive an unemployment
benefit (w´) and the eﬀort will be zero (e = 0).
For the unemployed worker, there is a probability b, per unit of time, in
which he will be out of work, due to replacement (frictional unemployment -
1
b ), this rate is assumed to be exogenous. In addition, each employee has an
intertemporal discount rate (r) which maximizes the present value of utility
(U ). It is assumed that this discount rate will always be higher than zero
(r > 0). The only choice the worker has is to select the eﬀort level. In case the
worker performs his work with his usual eﬀort level (chooses working hard,
no shirking), he will receive a wage (w) and will keep his job until exogenous
factors result in a dismissal.
In case he chooses not to work hard (shirking), there is a possibility (q), per
unit of time, of him being caught (by the supervision) and getting laid oﬀ.
It is to be expected that the worker will choose the eﬀort level that maxi-
mizes his intertemporal utility. This involves a comparison between the values
of the utilities, in the cases of working hard (no shirking), working hard (shirk-
ing) and when the worker is unemployed. Thus, the expected utility must be
calculated, throughout the life cycle of a worker who opts for “shirking” and
match the expected utility throughout the life cycle, for a worker who chooses
to "shirk". The worker will choose working hard (no shirking), only if the util-
ity of not shirking is higher than the utility on shirking. Thus, this becomes
the condition for the worker to choose working hard (no-shirking condition -
NSC). Calculating the critical wage (w) that respects this condition, we have:
w ≥ e + w´+
(
e
q
)(
b
u
+ r
)
(2)
Where u = (N−L)N represents the unemployment rate.
According to Stiglitz (2009), when firms manage to select the monitoring
level (q) they can then make an exchange (trade-oﬀ) between monitoring level
and wages. Supposing a variation occurs in the supervision level (q) ceteris
paribus, it is possible to build an inverse relation between the supervision
level and the wage that attends the NSC condition, an issue that will be as-
sessed in the article.
In the next section an analysis is made of a case of variation in the level
of supervision of a firm in the metal mechanic area, testing the main proposi-
tions of the shirking model, developed in this section.
3 Case Study
The objective of this section is to relate the theory of the eﬃciency wage (shirk-
ing model) to the case of Bruning Tecnometal2, using productivity data of the
2Bruning Tecnometal LTD was founded by Mr. Ernesto Rehn on April 1, 1947, in the city of
Panambi in Rio Grande do Sul, where its production plant is located, to this day. Currently, Brun-
ing produces shaped metal parts by means of low temperature processes (room temperature),
called metal stamping. Added to this, the firm has welding and painting processes, which are
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production line of aluminium made fuel tanks, for a given change in the level
of supervision and the resulting implications. For this analysis the case study
methodology will be used. This methodology has already been used in similar
situations by Raﬀ& Summers (1987) in the case of Ford, and by Lazear (2000),
in the case of Safelite. Besides, for this investigation, a research strategy will
be adopted in line with what Bartel et al. (2004) and later Ichniowski & Shaw
(2013) called Insider Econometrics3.
One of the advantages of researching with data from within the company,
according to Ichniowski & Shaw (2013), is the possibility of identifying the be-
havioral mechanisms that explain the connection between the administrative
policies and the results, in terms of productivity, before “noises” are incorpo-
rated to the data.
Bruning is located in Panambi, a city with 38,058 inhabitants4 and has
3,400 workers. It employs 25.40% of the male population between 19 and 59
years of age and 4.16% of the female population between 19 and 59 years of
age IBGE (2010). Bruning suﬀers an enormous shortage of manpower. There-
fore, there is a constant eﬀort to reduce the total number of employees. The
elimination of a supervisor from the production line of aluminum fuel tanks
is among this eﬀorts. This elimination lasted fromNovember 2010 to October
2011.
The data of the case refer to primary data obtained from two sources (1)
through a monitoring system called CODI5, that supplies the andon6 func-
tions of takt time7 measurer in the production line of aluminium-made fuel
tanks; and (2) through the Human Resources department of the firm. The data
were measured for two groups of workers, identified in this study as Group 1
and Group 2.
The following data were collected: (1) Performance (productivity); (2) Ef-
ficiency; (3) Availability; (4) Salaries. Where: (1) Performance (productivity:
is the relationship between the time spent for the production of the item in
question and the theoretical time considered to form the cost of the item. In a
simplified manner, it is the speed (eﬀort / concentration) with which the oper-
ator works; (2) Eﬃciency: is the relationship between the time the machine is
in production by the total time in which it is available for production. It can
be said, in a simplified way, that it is the total amount of time in which the
sometimes necessary to supplement the pieces produced for customers. In 2013, Bruning had a
revenue of US$ 256 million. With such a revenue, Bruning is considered one of the 1,000 largest
companies in Brazil (Melhores & Maiores Exame, 2013). Today, Bruning represents 48% of the
tax revenue of the city of Panambi
3Such a case can be classified as Ichniowski & Shaw (2013) Insider Econometrics, as it meets
the five characteristics of Insider Econometric Research, which are: (1) estimate a regression of
productivity, where productivity is a function of some administrative practice; (2) identify why
administrative practices alter the level of productivity and where they have greater and lesser
impact; (3) modeling administrative practices; (4) work with data at the company level (micro-
level data) related to employees or group of employees with a common production function;
and (5) use field research or interviews with managers within companies to formulate testable
hypotheses and interpret results, providing additional evidence on the economic mechanisms
behind the results.
4According to IBGE, data from the 2010 census.
5A system manufactured by CODI enterprise (http://www.codi.com.br).
6A visual management tool that shows the state of operations during production. An andon
can indicate the production status (amount produced, amount produced with defects, time when
machine stopped). For more details see Marchwinski & Shook (2003).
7Time available for production divided between the client’s demand. For more details see
Marchwinski & Shook (2003).
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operator is eﬀectively working; (3) Availability: time in which the machine
was available for production within the working shifts. It takes into account
the total time of the shifts, minus the times for maintenance or unexpected
stops8; and (4) Wages: nominal net income earned by the workers in each of
the functions.
4.8% of the employees working in the production of aluminium fuel tanks,
responsible for 15% of the firm revenue. This is produced to meet the needs of
truck assemblers operating in Brazil. Within Bruning, there is a separate area
(called line 47), isolated from the rest of the factory, built exclusively to hold
the production line of the fuel tanks. This line does not suﬀer interference
from other production sites at Bruning.
The CODI controls are installed in the operations of welding of partitions
and of lids. Those stages are the robotized welding operations of the fuel tanks
and constitute the bottleneck operations9 in the production of aluminium fuel
tanks. In this way, these two operations dictate the production rhythm of the
entire assembly line.
The welding operations, for these two points are done by pre-programmed
robots, prepared exclusively for these operations. The operators who work in
these two stages receive 40 hours training on soldering and identification of
possible defects, and another 40 hours training on the operation of the robot.
The times andmovements of these two operations are quantified and analyzed
by the Bruning production engineering team. Nonetheless, the operator can
opt “not to pull his weight” during the preparation and positioning of the
tanks for the robotized welding and / or after the performance of the welding,
when the tanks need to be moved again, from the robot to the next operation.
The preparation, positioning and removal of the tanks are manual operations,
where the operator can simply takemore time than necessary, be it positioning
the tank, or not removing the tank after it has been soldered by the robot. The
choice of when to perform the operations is at the discretion of the operator.
Production line 47 possesses a theoretical manpower distribution, through-
out the production process. Such distribution is called capacity frame. The
capacity frame for this line foresees the need for 40 operators and two su-
pervisors per shift in order to obtain maximum production with all the work
places filled, respecting the logic of the takt time10. The takt time is measured
by Codi, along the welding robots. While the robot is performing the welding
operation, the Codi system is doing the reading and registering the times. Be-
tween the welding of one tank and another, the Codi system registers that the
robot is not being used, which characterizes a waste of time in the process and
the reduction of such time represents productivity gain. The function of the
operator is to change the tanks at the end of each welding operation. With-
out adequate supervision it is very easy for the operator to adopt a shirking
posture during the course of these exchanges.
According to data from the Human Resources department at Bruning,Line
47 presents a low turnover rate. Within the analyzed period for this work
(11/01/2010 - 10/31/2012), the turnover rate remained within the historical
patterns of 3.7% per year. The mean time at the company for employees of
8As unexpected stops we can have: lack of electricity, production meetings, going to the toilet,
etc.
9Bottleneck operation is one that presents the largest processing time.
10Time available for production divided by customer demand. For more details see March-
winski & Shook (2003).
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each shift during the period analyzed in this study was 2 years and 11 months
for employees of the first shift and three years and four months for the second
shift employees. It is important to say that within the sample period the num-
ber of workers in each group was constant and equal to 40. This is because
each operator has a specific and unique function, so it is not possible to pro-
duce if someone is missing. Operators who missed work were immediately
replaced.
Between November 2010 and October 2011 a modification was made in
relation to the degree of supervision in production line 47. During that period,
one of the assembly line supervisors of the capacity frame of the second shift
(Group 2), was eliminated. This modification did not take place in the first
shift (Group 1), which continued having two supervisors.
Such modification was made due to the great diﬃculty of the company
in finding qualified11 manpower for this function. This modification led to
a change in the supervisors/supervised ratio with a diﬀerence of 50% be-
tween one shift and the other. For the first shift (Group 1) this ratio re-
mained at 240 = 0.05, however, for the second shift (Group 2), this ratio be-
came 140 = 0.025. In November 2011, the second supervisor of the second
shift (Group 2) was replaced. With this, the supervisors/supervised ratio was
the same again for both shifts (groups). Thus, between November 2011 and
October 2012, both shifts (groups) maintained a supervisors/supervised ra-
tio of 240 = 0.05. Therefore, during the period of one year, the two groups
operated with diﬀerent supervision levels, which, according to the shirking
model, as developed by Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984), represented an opportunity
for shirking behaviors, when "one is not pulling his weight”, since the chance
of an operator being caught practicing this type of posture was reduced.
While Group 1 (first shift) remained with two supervisors during two
years (between November 2010 and October 2012), Group 2 (second shift)
had one supervisor during the first year (between November 2010 and Octo-
ber 2011) and two supervisors during the second year (between November
2011 and October 2012). For each variable, in each group, 464 observations
were generated regarding performance, eﬃciency and availability, which will
be analyzed in the next section.
4 Empirical Strategy
First, as a consequence of the nature of available data and the theory model
of eﬃciency wage, a hypothesis test for the mean of productivity between the
two groups of workers was conduct. Specifically, the following two hypothe-
ses were tested:
H0: Before the increase in the supervision level for Group 2, productivity
was higher in Group 1 than in Group 2 (PM1 > PM2), therefore, the average
productivity must be greater in Group 1 than in Group 2 without wage diﬀer-
entiation.
H1: after the increase of the supervision level in Group 2, the moral hazard
of the group submitted to more supervision (Group 2) was reduced, becoming
equal to that of Group 1 (PM1 = PM2), therefore, the average productivity of
Group 1 should be equal to that of Group 2.
11For this function the minimum qualification for hiring is a mid-level technical course in
mechanics.
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The tested groups were of the semi-closed type, with small alterations of
the participants, due to the low turnover of the sector (3.7% per year), keep-
ing the other conditions constant (ceteris paribus), ensuring the lowest possi-
ble influence of the work environment, the degree of worker experience and
even turnover. So, this was a real and timely case study where it was possi-
ble to work with more data and in a smaller universe than that evaluated by
Gatica et al. (1995), Arbache (2001), Esteves (2006, 2008) and Uhr & Ziero
(2011), who used aggregate and sectorial data from the Brazilian economy.
Second, with the objective of evaluating the eﬀect of the increased degree of
supervision on Group 2, a natural experiment12, the authors opted to use
the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences method. The choice of this empirical strategy
is mainly justified for having information of two diﬀerent groups on perfor-
mance, eﬃciency and availability along time. In this case, the authors seek to
evaluate the intervention through the increase in supervision in the produc-
tion lines, focused on only one of the groups.
The central hypothesis for the identification of the impact in the increased
supervision of Group 2 resides in assuming that, without the supervision in-
crease on the second group, the performance, eﬃciency and availability of
both groups would follow parallel trajectories. In other words, any other
shocks that might aﬀect the trajectories of the interest variables between the
treated group and the control group would exert the same influence.
Therefore, any deviation observed in the trajectories of the interest vari-
ables between the two groups, in periods subsequent to the intervention, can
be attributed to the eﬀect of the supervision increase on Group 2.
Formally, the following equation will be estimated:
Yit = α0 +α1Gi +α2Pt +α3GiPt (3)
For i = 1,2 and t = 1, . . . ,464.
The dependent variable Y is both a measure of the production perfor-
mance and a measure of eﬃciency and availability. While the variable G is
a binary variable that takes on value 1 for group 2 and value 0 for group 1.
Variable P is also a binary variable that takes on value 1 for all the observa-
tions of periods after the 03/11/2011 (date of the beginning of the increased
monitoring for group 2), and zero for the periods prior to that date.
The coeﬃcient of interest to be estimated is α3 that captures the diﬀer-
ence of the conditional diﬀerences of the dependent variable between the two
groups throughout time. In order to visualize this, consider the four condi-
tionals below:
E[Yit |Gi = 1,Pi = 1] = α0 +α1 +α2 +α3 +E[ǫit |Gi = 1,Pi = 1]
E[Yit |Gi = 1,Pi = 0] = α0 +α1 +E[ǫit |Gi = 0,Pi = 1]
E[Yit |Gi = 0,Pi = 1] = α0 +α2 +E[ǫit |Gi = 0,Pi = 1]
E[Yit |Gi = 0,Pi = 0] = α0 +E[ǫit |Gi = 1,Pi = 1]
(4)
12According to Angrist & Pischke (2014), natural experiments take place when an exogenous
event occurs, generally some governmental policy change (of the firm), generating alterations
in the environment in which the individuals, families or workers operate. In order to analyze
a natural experiment one must always have a control group which has not been aﬀected by the
change and a treatment group that is aﬀected by the event.
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From the diﬀerences (a)− (b) and (c)− (d) we obtain:
(a)− (b) = α2 +α3 +E[ǫit |Gi = 1,Pi = 0]−E[ǫit |Gi = 1,Pi = 0]
(c)− (d) = α2 +E[ǫit |Gi = 1,Pi = 1]−E[ǫit |Gi = 1,Pi = 0]
(5)
Equation 3 was also estimated in three other specifications for checking
the robustness of the estimated results. The second of the four specifications
includes an interaction term between the binary variable that identifies the
groups and a trend variable (t). With this interaction, the trajectories of the
dependent variables are allowed to have diﬀerent tendencies between the two
groups. In the third specification the interaction of the second is removed and
dummies of months are included to control eﬀects related to seasonal issues
that might aﬀect productivity and eﬃciency. In the fourth and last specifica-
tion, both the interaction as well as the dummies of months are included. The
standard errors were estimated by the White correction process for the covari-
ance matrix. Furthermore, three diﬀerent samples were used to perform the
step described above.
In the first sample, all the available observations were used. This sample is
referred to as the “Complete Sample”. The second sample just contains infor-
mation within the time frame of the 6 months before and after 11/03/2011.
This sample was called “six months sample”. Finally, the third sample con-
tains observations within the month prior to and after 03/11/2011. This sam-
ple was named “one month sample”. This procedure was adopted to inves-
tigate if the monitoring eﬀect, in case it exists, presents some heterogeneous
behavior over time. In the one month sample, only two specifications are es-
timated, those that do not include seasonal dummies, that in this case would
be perfectly collinear with the variable P.
With the purpose of checking the validity of the results, two procedures
were adopted. The first is referred to here as “temporal placebo”. It consists of
the estimation of all the specifications used with the alteration of the date of
treatment for previous periods to the real supervision change in group 2. The
idea behind this procedure is to check the existence of trajectories previously
not parallel between the dependent variables of the two groups, which inval-
idates the identification impact hypothesis of the diﬀerences in diﬀerences
method in our case. If the results observed in the main estimations were in
fact significant and were capturing the supervision eﬀect on the performance
and the eﬃciency, when the estimations for periods prior to the change of su-
pervision policy are done, what is expected is an absence of statistical signif-
icance. In this procedure, the information generated after 11/03/2011 is not
used, the purpose is not to contaminate the estimates of the temporal placebo
with information of periods when the intervention is in eﬀect.
The “temporal placebos” were estimated in two periods with diﬀerent sam-
ples. The first is six months before the date of the intervention 05/02/2011,
with a sample from 11/01/2010 to 10/30/2011, while the second one is a
month before the date of intervention, 10/03/2011, with a sample from 09/01/2011
until 10/30/2011. The other checking procedure used for robustness consists
in estimating all the specifications having the availability degree of the ma-
chines to work with as a dependent variable, which in principle should not be
influenced by the supervision increase, since machines only suﬀer influence
from structural factors such as the supply of electric energy, for instance, indi-
cating that if there is no availability variation with the increase of supervision
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and there are productivity and eﬃciency variations, there are indications of
robust results13 .
5 Results
Before analyzing the results of the models based on the diﬀerences in diﬀer-
ences method, some median tests were carried out, indicating diﬀerent levels
of productivity between groups before the supervision increase occurred in
Group 2. From the values calculated in Table D.3.14, it can be stated that,
from the statistical point of view, the medians for Productivity and Eﬃciency
obtained between Group 1, with two supervisors and Group 2, with one su-
pervisor, are statistically diﬀerent. For the availability, the averages do not
show significant statistical diﬀerence.
Productivity and eﬃciency are related to the performance of the produc-
tion line workers. Availability, on the other hand, is related to the unexpected
stops (maintenance problems, lack of electric energy, etc.). Thus, it is coherent
with the shirking model not to find diﬀerences between the averages for avail-
ability, given that the diﬀerence in the number of supervisors does not have
much influence on unexpected stops. Thus, hypothesis H0 is thus confirmed.
With the insertion of the second supervisor in Group 2, based on Table D.1,
it can be asserted that, statistically, the averages obtained for Performance, Ef-
ficiency and Availability among Group 1, with two supervisors, and Group
2, with two supervisors, are not diﬀerent. The H1 hypothesis is confirmed
this way. In addition to this average diﬀerence analysis between groups, the
analysis of Group 2 itself was also performed, before and after the increase in
supervision, in which, according to Table D.2, it was proved that the group, in
relation to itself, obtained a significant increase with the introduction of one
more supervisor. However, in order to investigate the shock eﬀect of supervi-
sion that occurred in group 2 in more detail, the results of the diﬀerences in
diﬀerences method are highlighted.
Table D.3, presents the estimates of diﬀerences in diﬀerences of the in-
creased monitoring eﬀect on Group 2, in terms of productivity. In the full
sample, in three of the estimated specifications the eﬀect is positive and statis-
tically significant to 1.0%. The estimated coeﬃcients indicate that increased
supervision generated, on average, an increase in daily performance in the
range of 13.5% to 16.8%. The estimations for the other two samples also cor-
roborate the positive eﬀect observed in the complete sample, with the eﬀect
of the increase in supervision over the second group being higher in the short
term. In the six-month sample estimates are all significant at 1.0% and range
from 16.3% to 19.3%. In the one-month sample the estimated eﬀects are also
significant and are between 21.9% and 26.8%. In the three samples the greater
coeﬃcients are associated with the model with the presence of the possibility
of diﬀerent trajectories of the dependent variables among the groups.
Table D.4, presents the results of the estimations where the dependent
variable is eﬃciency. The results indicate that the monitoring is significant
only in the six-month sample. The estimates range between 22.6% and 26,7%.
13For an additional example of the falsification test see Williams & Bretteville-Jensen (2014).
14Appendixes Appendix A and Appendix B highlight graphic analysis of the series. In Ap-
pendix Appendix B, are the tables with the estimated results.
Is there a trade-off between supervision and wage? 121
In the models with interaction between tendency and group, the coeﬃcients
were merely significant to 10%.
The results of the “temporal placebo” estimates for performance can be
observed in Table D.5. In the sample with six-month sample, the estimated
coeﬃcient was significant only in one of the four specifications. In the one-
month sample, no coeﬃcient associated to the “false” intervention eﬀect was
significant. These results indicate that there were no diﬀerent previous ten-
dencies in the performance between the two groups. Therefore, the results
presented in table A.4.1 are corroborated as an eﬀect of the increased moni-
toring of Group 2 on the performance of the workers. Table A.4.7 presents
the results of the temporal placebos for eﬃciency. In the six-month sample
three coeﬃcients are statistically significant, however there is no robustness
in the placebo estimates. Positive and negative coeﬃcients were observed. In
the one-month sample there are no statistically significant coeﬃcients.
Finally, Table D.6 presents the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimations over
the availability variable. No coeﬃcient, for any of the three samples, indicates
eﬀect of the monitoring. As it was previously discussed, there is no reason
whatsoever for availability to suﬀer any change due to increase in monitor-
ing. The absence of statistical significance in the estimated coeﬃcients for
availability, reinforces the robustness of the results we observed mainly for
the worker productivity. Therefore, it is evaluated that the estimates present
in Table D.3 are not spurious, because if they were, it would be reasonable to
imagine finding statistical significance in the estimations where availability is
the dependent variable.
From the verification that there was an increase in productivity with the
supervision increase in Group 2, the result mentioned by Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984), that is, an inverse relationship between supervision and wages, is
reached. Since no diﬀerentiation was made at the wage level among the work-
ers allocated to the first and second shift, in spite of the elimination of the
supervisor position for the second shift (between November 2010 and Octo-
ber 2011), it was to be expected that the production level of the second shift
(Group 2) would present a reduction to the level of the first shift (Group 1)H0
and a productivity increase in group 2 after the H1 shock. Such condition was
justified, mainly due to the modification of the detection probability (q) of the
“not pulling one’s weight” (shirking model), that was reduced by half with
the elimination of a supervisor (q1 , q2). Supposing that before the detection
probability of the “not pulling one’s weight” condition was (q1 = 50%), in the
second moment we have the reduction in half (q2 = 25%). Next, a simulation
for the case being analyzed is conducted.
Table D.7 below presents a synthesis of the mains results of the eﬀects of
supervision on the productivity and eﬃciency. It also shows the results of the
robustness check that use availability as the dependent variable (placebo).
In addition to the econometric analysis, a simulation exercise was held. Us-
ing Equation 2 it is possible to perform a simulation exercise and calculate the
wage that should be put into practice, in order to maintain the worker eﬀort
level, even with the reduction in supervision level and consequent reduction
of detection probability (q) of the shirking behavior (wage eﬃciency).
w ≥ e + w´+
(
e
q
)(
b
u
+ r
))
(6)
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Table 1: Monitoring Eﬀect on Performance, Eﬃciency and Availability (Placebo)
Full Sample Six month sample One month sample
(01/11/2010 – 30/10/2012) (02/05/2011 – 30/04/2012) (03/10/2011 – 30/11/2011)
Perf. Eﬃ. Aval. Perf. Eﬃ. Aval. Perf. Eﬃ. Aval.
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Monitoring eﬀect 0,168∗∗∗
(−0,033)
0,283∗∗∗
(−0,104)
0,099
(−0,090)
0,168∗∗∗
(−0,046)
0,226∗
(−0,127)
0,038
(−0,110)
0,268∗∗∗
(−0,089)
0,267
(−0,202)
0,030
(−0,157)
Group 2 −0,104∗∗∗
(−0,018)
−0,028
(−0,054)
0,026
(−0,049)
−0,117∗∗
(−0,056)
−0,221
(−0,153)
−0,107
(−0,129)
0,512
(−0,797)
0,719
(−1,627)
0,264
(−1,367)
Post 01/11/2011 −0,020∗
(−0,011)
−0,312∗∗∗
(−0,031)
−0,313∗∗∗
(−0,026)
−0,063∗
(−0,033)
−0,298∗∗∗
(−0,086)
−0,213∗∗∗
(−0,073)
0,001
(−0,041)
−0,084
(−0,109)
−0,083
(−0,082)
Constant 4,314∗∗∗
(−0,016)
3,901∗∗∗
(−0,043)
4,219∗∗∗
(−0,038)
4,347∗∗∗
(−0,027)
3,856∗∗∗
(−0,053)
4,101∗∗∗
(−0,038)
4,338∗∗∗
(−0,035)
3,819∗∗∗
(−0,062)
4,095∗∗∗
(−0,039)
R2 0,326 0,352 0,341 0,283 0,55 0,567 0,303 0,033 0,024
R2 Adjusted 0,315 0,341 0,33 0,26 0,536 0,553 0,26 -0,026 -0,036
Observations 928 927 927 460 459 459 70 70 70
Tendency Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seasonality Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - - -
Note: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.
Source: Own Elaboration parting from the results.
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Since there were no modifications in the salaries paid to the production
line workers throughout time, the salaries paid between t0 and t1 were the
same as between t1 and t2 (w1 = w2).
Eﬀort (e) would also remain the same, as well as unemployment payment
(w¯). Therefore, it can reasonably be argued that employee discount rate (r)
also does not suﬀer alteration, that frictional unemployment (b) remains sta-
ble and that unemployment wage (w¯) for an employee who earns US$ 496,02
per month is US$ 388,861. Considering frictional unemployment of (b = 1%)
and the 2010 rate of unemployment as (u = 6,7%), we have that:
w1 ≥ e1 + w´+
(
e1
q1
)
.
(
b
u
+ r
)
→ 496.02 ≥ e1 +388.86+
(
e1
0.5
)
.
( 0.01
0.067
+1
)
(7)
e1 ≥ 31.62
Since the eﬀort is the same in both moments, it is possible to calculate
what the wage to be paid with the supervision reduction (q) so as to maintain
a constant eﬀort level.
w2 ≥ e1 + w´+
(
e1
q2
)
.
(
b
u
+ r
)
→w2 ≥ 31.62+388.86
+
(55.6615
0.25
)
.
( 0.01
0.067
+1
) (8)
w2 ≥ US$568.71 w2 ≥ R$568.71 w2 ≥ R$1,000.9382, a wage 14,66%
higher than the current wage paid.
Yet, as the wage (w) remains constant, it is to be expected that the eﬀort
level would have a significant reduction due to the modification of the detec-
tion probability (q) of the “not pulling one’s weight” (shirking model).
w2 ≥ e2 + w´+
(
e2
q2
)
.
(
b
u
+ r
)
→ 496.02 ≥ e2 +388.86+
(
e2
0.25
)
.
( 0.01
0.067
+1
)
(9)
e2 ≥ 32.8032 e2 ≥ 18.63, a 41.08% reduction in the eﬀort level.
In order to maintain the eﬀort level, according to the Shapiro & Stiglitz
(1984) model, it would be necessary to increase the wage of the 40 work-
ers(machine operators by 14.66% (fromUS$ 496.02 to US$ 568.71) This would
represent an increase in the production costs (ceteris paribus) of US$ 2,907.62
((US$ 568.71 - US$ 496.02).40). Considering that the wage of the supervisor
is US$ 624.9815, in case it is possible to maintain the productivity level by
adding one more supervisors, such option proves to be less costly than prac-
ticing a wage eﬃciency policy. In the Bruning case, the economic advantage
of working with one more supervisor becomes evident, since the additional
costs imposed by the hiring and maintenance of this added worker are much
lower than the gains obtained through a higher productivity of the welding
line of the fuel tanks, thanks to a reduction of the “shirking behavior”.
15Net wage, without social security charges
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6 Final Considerations
The objective of this work was to test the existence of a trade-oﬀ between su-
pervision and wage, using the eﬃciency wage model, more specifically the
shirking model, Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984) for data obtained from the Bruning
Tecnometal Ltda company in the production line of aluminium fuel tanks,
based on the Insider Econometrics approach. The relevance of the present
study is that it shows how productivity can be increased, showing its funda-
mentals as well as the measurement of results are.
The analysis of the series indicated that there was an increase in produc-
tivity as soon as the level of supervision increased. Besides, the econometric
tests indicate the existence of the positive correlation according to Shapiro &
Stiglitz (1984) and is confirmed for the Bruning case. The results point to
the increased daily average productivity of the workers who belong to Group
2 after the increase in supervision. The estimated eﬀect is ranges between
13.5% and 26.8% depending on the the sample estimation. The results are
robust to diﬀerent distortion strategies. Since the eﬃciency of the estimated
results is significant in only one of the samples used, this does not allow us to
accomplish an accurate analysis of the eﬀect of increased supervision on this
variable.
The main conclusion of this study is that after the confirmation that the
two working hypothesis proved to be significant from the statistical point of
view, the firm can choose between the addition of one more supervisor, with a
cost of U$ 624.98 instead of practicing an eﬃciency wage for all the 40 work-
ers who operate machines in the production line.
Through the calculation of the theoretical model, the increase over the
wage should be 14.66% to maintain the same level of eﬀort, for the 40 assem-
bly line operators. Such increase would represent an additional cost of US$
2,907.72. In this way, in case the firm chooses to add one more supervisor
(wage of US$ 624,98) instead of practicing eﬃciency salaries (US$ 2,907.72), it
would reduce the cost by US$ 2,282.74. Thus, it becomes more advantageous
for the company to increase the number of supervisors instead of increasing
wages.
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Table A.1: Main papers about Personnel Economics with a single firm data.
Authors Year Research Question Type of Acitivity Unit Observation Frequency Main Results
Lazear (2000) 2000 Productivity and sort-
ing eﬀects of piece rate
windshield installing Individual Monthly Adoption of piece rate improve produc-
tivity by 44%
Paarsch & Shearer (2000) 2000 Productivity eﬀects of
piece rates
Tree planting Individual Daily Piece rates increase productivity at least
23%
Knez & Simester (2001) 2001 Impact of profit-sharing
on-time departures
Airport departures Airport Monthly Profit-Sharing improves on-time depar-
tures
Hamilton et al. (2003) 2003 Productivity and sort-
ing eﬀects to team com-
pensation
Textile Individual Weekly Adoption of team leads to 14% produc-
tivity increase
Shearer (2004) 2004 Productivity eﬀects of
piece rate
Tree planting Individual Daily Piece rates increase productivity at least
22%
Bartel et al. (2004) 2004 Impact of HRM on sales
growth
Banking Branch Yearly Some elements of the HRM environment
improve perfomance
Bandiera et al. (2005) 2005 Productivity and eﬀects
of relative vs. absolute
incentive
Fruit picking Individual Daily Piece rates increase productivity by 59%
Freeman & Kleiner (2005) 2005 Productivity and profits
after the change from
piece to time rates
Shoes manufacturing Plant Monthly Shift from piece to time rates decrease
productivity and wages but increase
profits
Jones & Kato (2006) 2006 Performance eﬀects of
oﬀ-line teams
Light manufacturing Individual Daily Oﬀ-line teams increase productivity by
3%. Eﬀects dissipate over time.
Bandiera et al. (2007) 2007 Pay and performance soft fruit Individual Daily Managerial performance pay raises both
the mean and the dispersion of produc-
tivity
Bandiera et al. (2009) 2009 Social connections and
incentives
soft fruit Individual Daily Payment schemes alterer managers be-
haviours in relation their social connec-
tions.
Franceschelli et al. (2010) 2010 Productivity and eﬀects
of piece rate
Textile Individual Daily Piece-rate plus basic-wage scheme has
an eﬀect on productivity of 28%
Jones et al. (2010) 2010 Impact of HRM on pro-
ductivity
Food-processing Production Lines Weeks There is a joint eﬀect of teams and per-
formance related pay.
Frick et al. (2013) 2013 Impact of HRM on pro-
ductivity, accidents and
absence rates
steel-producing production unit Monthly A quality-adjusted measure of output
does not reveal benefits from teamwork
or performance-related pay.
Note: adapted from Jones et al. (2008).
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Appendix B
Figure B.1: Graphic Analysis of the series before and after the su-
pervision shock
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Appendix C
Figure C.1: Graphic Analysis of the productivity gap between
groups
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Appendix D
Table D.1: Test of mean diﬀer-
ences Group 1 (with 2 super-
visors) against Group 2 (with
1 supervisor)
Performance Eﬃciency
d¯ 8,224761 d¯ 5,106076
Sd 12,78741 Sd 13,7883
Sd¯ 0,815296 Sd¯ 0,87911
t 10,08807 t 5,808234
Source: Elaborated by the author
(2014)
Table D.2: Test of mean diﬀer-
ences - Group 1 (with 2 super-
visors) against Group 2 (with
2 supervisors)
Performance Eﬃciency
d¯ -1,24905 d¯ 0,397409
Sd 9,270631 Sd 12,96114
Sd¯ 0,591074 Sd¯ 0,826372
t -2,11319 t 0,480908
Source: Elaborated by the author
(2014)
Table D.3: Diﬀerence be-
tween means test based on
pairs of observations - Group
2 (with 1 supervisor) against
Group 2 (with 2 supervisors)
Performance Eﬃciency
d¯ -7,85312 d¯ 5,451354
Sd 12,16165 Sd 17,26995
Sd¯ 0,775398 Sd¯ 1,101092
t -10,1279 t 4,950861
Source: Elaborated by the author
(2014)
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Table D.4: Estimates of the Monitoring Eﬀect on Performance
Full Sample Six month sample One month sample
(01/11/2010 – 30/10/2012) (02/05/2011 – 30/04/2012) (03/10/2011 – 30/11/2011)
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Monitoring eﬀect 0,135∗∗∗
(−0,018)
0,047
(−0,031)
0,135∗∗∗
(−0,016)
0,168∗∗∗
(−0,033)
0,163∗∗∗
(−0,025)
0,193∗∗∗
(−0,043)
0,163∗∗∗
(−0,023)
0,168∗∗∗
(−0,046)
0,219∗∗∗
(−0,058)
0,268∗∗∗
(−0,089)
Group 2 −0,121∗∗∗
(−0,014)
−0,165∗∗∗
(−0,019)
−0,121∗∗∗
(−0,012)
−0,104∗∗∗
(−0,018)
−0,125∗∗∗
(−0,017)
−0,080
(−0,050)
−0,125∗∗∗
(−0,017)
−0,117∗∗
(−0,056)
−0,110∗∗
(−0,050)
0,512
(−0,797)
Post 01/11/2011 −0,019
(−0,012)
−0,019
(−0,012)
−0,020∗
(−0,011)
−0,020∗
(−0,011)
−0,115∗∗∗
(−0,016)
−0,115∗∗∗
(−0,016)
−0,062∗∗
(−0,030)
−0,063∗
(−0,033)
0,001
(−0,041)
0,001
(−0,041)
Constant 4,308∗∗∗
(−0,009)
4,308∗∗∗
(−0,009)
4,321∗∗∗
(−0,015)
4,314∗∗∗
(−0,016)
4,364∗∗∗
(−0,011)
4,364∗∗∗
(−0,011)
4,346∗∗∗
(−0,026)
4,347∗∗∗
(−0,027)
4,338∗∗∗
(−0,034)
4,338∗∗∗
(−0,035)
R2 0,112 0,126 0,325 0,326 0,122 0,123 0,283 0,283 0,298 0,303
R2 Adjusted 0,109 0,122 0,314 0,315 0,116 0,116 0,262 0,26 0,266 0,26
Observations 928 928 928 928 460 460 460 460 70 70
Tendency No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Seasonality No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes - -
Note: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.
Source: Own Elaboration parting from the results.
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Table D.5: Estimates of Monitoring eﬀect on Eﬃciency
Full sample Six month sample One month window
(01/11/2010 – 30/10/2012) (02/05/2011 – 30/04/2012) (03/10/2011 – 30/11/2011)
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Monitoring eﬀect 0,070
(−0,062)
−0,024
(−0,110)
0,071
(−0,053)
0,283∗∗∗
(−0,104)
0,260∗∗∗
(−0,092)
0,267∗
(−0,145)
0,260∗∗∗
(−0,067)
0,226∗
(−0,127)
0,204
(−0,145)
0,267
(−0,202)
Group 2 −0,134∗∗∗
(−0,032)
−0,181∗∗∗
(−0,056)
−0,134∗∗∗
(−0,033)
−0,028
(−0,054)
−0,170∗∗∗
(−0,041)
−0,159
(−0,141)
−0,170∗∗∗
(−0,041)
−0,221
(−0,153)
−0,082
(−0,085)
0,719
(−1,627)
Post 01/11/2011 −0,309∗∗∗
(−0,038)
−0,309∗∗∗
(−0,038)
−0,311∗∗∗
(−0,031)
−0,312∗∗∗
(−0,031)
−0,519∗∗∗
(−0,058)
−0,519∗∗∗
(−0,058)
−0,256∗∗∗
(−0,080)
−0,298∗∗∗
(−0,086)
−0,084
(−0,109)
−0,084
(−0,109)
Constant 3,773∗∗∗
(−0,020)
3,773∗∗∗
(−0,020)
3,941∗∗∗
(−0,042)
3,901∗∗∗
(−0,043)
3,848∗∗∗
(−0,024)
3,848∗∗∗
(−0,024)
3,811∗∗∗
(−0,053)
3,856∗∗∗
(−0,053)
3,819∗∗∗
(−0,062)
3,819∗∗∗
(−0,062)
R2 0,088 0,089 0,348 0,352 0,151 0,151 0,550 0,550 0,031 0,033
R2 Adjusted 0,085 0,085 0,338 0,341 0,145 0,143 0,537 0,536 -0,013 -0,026
Observations 927 927 927 927 459 459 459 459 70 70
Tendency No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Seasonality No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes - -
Note: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
Source: Own elaboration parting from the results.
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Table D.6: “Temporal Placebo” Performance
Six month sample One month window
(01/11/2010 – 31/10/2011) (01/09/2011 – 31/10/2011)
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Monitoring eﬀect −0,009
(−0,027)
0,054
(−0,044)
−0,009
(−0,024)
−0,097∗∗
(−0,047)
−0,061
(−0,071)
−0,039
(−0,099)
Group 2 −0,116∗∗∗
(−0,020)
−0,084∗∗∗
(−0,026)
−0,116∗∗∗
(−0,017)
−0,161∗∗∗
(−0,026)
−0,049
(−0,051)
0,187
(−0,878)
Post 02/05/2011 or 3/10/2011 0,111∗∗∗
(−0,017)
0,111∗∗∗
(−0,017)
0,045
(−0,030)
0,044
(−0,030)
0,004
(−0,049)
0,004
(−0,049)
Constant 4,252∗∗∗
(−0,013)
4,252∗∗∗
(−0,013)
4,323∗∗∗
(−0,024)
4,335∗∗∗
(−0,025)
4,334∗∗∗
(−0,035)
4,334∗∗∗
(−0,035)
R2 0,244 0,25 0,38 0,386 0,08 0,081
R2 Adjusted 0,239 0,243 0,362 0,366 0,04 0,027
Observation 462 462 462 462 74 74
Tendency No Yes No Yes No Yes
Seasonality No No Yes Yes - -
Note: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Source: Own elaboration parting from the results.
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Table D.7: “Temporal Placebo” Eﬃciency
Full Sample Six month sample One month window
(01/11/2010 – 30/10/2012) (02/05/2011 – 30/04/2012) (03/10/2011 – 30/11/2011)
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Monitoring eﬀect −0,031
(−0,053)
−0,053
(−0,093)
−0,031
(−0,047)
0,099
(−0,090)
0,085
(−0,076)
0,071
(−0,124)
0,084
(−0,055)
0,038
(−0,110)
0,008
(−0,127)
0,030
(−0,157)
Group 2 −0,039
(−0,025)
−0,050
(−0,047)
−0,039
(−0,028)
0,026
(−0,049)
−0,037
(−0,030)
−0,059
(−0,118)
−0,037
(−0,030)
−0,107
(−0,129)
−0,004
(−0,067)
0,264
(−1,367)
Post 01/11/2011 −0,311∗∗∗
(−0,030)
−0,311∗∗∗
(−0,030)
−0,313∗∗∗
(−0,026)
−0,313∗∗∗
(−0,026)
−0,400∗∗∗
(−0,046)
−0,400∗∗∗
(−0,046)
−0,173∗∗∗
(−0,067)
−0,213∗∗∗
(−0,073)
−0,083
(−0,081)
−0,083
(−0,082)
Constant 4,089∗∗∗
(−0,015)
4,089∗∗∗
(−0,015)
4,243∗∗∗
(−0,037)
4,219∗∗∗
(−0,038)
4,101∗∗∗
(−0,017)
4,101∗∗∗
(−0,017)
4,055∗∗∗
(−0,036)
4,101∗∗∗
(−0,038)
4,095∗∗∗
(−0,039)
4,095∗∗∗
(−0,039)
R2 0,146 0,146 0,339 0,341 0,165 0,165 0,567 0,567 0,024 0,024
R2 Adjusted 0,143 0,142 0,329 0,33 0,16 0,158 0,554 0,553 -0,021 -0,036
Observations 927 927 927 927 459 459 459 459 70 70
Tendency No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Seasonality No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes - -
Note: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Source: Own elaboration parting from the results.
